Research by the Association for Elections and Democracy (Perludem) entitled “Disruption of Voting Rights in the 2019 Election and 2020 Regional Election: Phenomenon and Mitigation Efforts” (2020) identified three forms of voter suppression in Indonesian elections. First, discrimination in regulations, such as the requirement to have an electronic KTP to access voting rights, which has the potential to eliminate the voting rights of indigenous peoples and refugees, and limitations in voting methods. Second, intimidation and violation of the right to vote. Needem’s research found a lot of hate speech against minority and vulnerable groups, harassment of the right to vote for mental disabilities, and intimidation of mining workers and workers in oil palm plantation areas. Third, information disruption or widely understood as disinformation.
Updating the results of the research findings, I found that many psychosocial attacks, disinformation and discrimination in the digital space had emerged ahead of the 2024 election. Once again, vulnerable and marginalized groups were the targets.
Discriminatory, misogynistic patterns and the undermining of voting rights ahead of the 2024 elections
There are three vulnerable groups that are my focus in this article, namely women, lesbians, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT), and mental disabilities. Reviewing the first one, I found two misogynistic and violent content targeting two female politicians, namely Grace Natalie from the Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI) and Noviana Kurniati, a legislative candidate (bacaleg) for the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP).
From these two cases, there is a narrative pattern that can be concluded. The narrative is packaged to damage the reputation of female candidates or female politicians by questioning religion, demeaning opinions, and associating targets with groups that are less liked by some in society, such as Gerwani and LGBT. Even in Novi’s case, personal data in the form of the person’s complete address and cellphone number was shared on social media.
There are three vulnerable groups that are my focus in this article, namely women, lesbians, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT), and mental disabilities. Reviewing the first one, I found two misogynistic and violent content targeting two female politicians, namely Grace Natalie from the Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI) and Noviana Kurniati, a legislative candidate (bacaleg) for the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP).
From these two cases, there is a narrative pattern that can be concluded. The narrative is packaged to damage the reputation of female candidates or female politicians by questioning religion, demeaning opinions, and associating targets with groups that are less liked by some in society, such as Gerwani and LGBT. Even in Novi’s case, personal data in the form of the person’s complete address and cellphone number was shared on social media.
The impact is no joke. The narrative of hatred that was fostered, as well as threats against Novi, led to persecution by a group of people against Novi.
There are several keywords that I use to find online content of attacks and discrimination against women, including “female legislative candidates” and “female elections”. From these two keywords, the keywords “gerwani” and “lonte democracy” emerged.
The second vulnerable group that is the target of online attacks is LGBT. Again, I found a narrative of discrimination in the targeted paid advertising content on Facebook. The ad was seen by 20 to 25 thousand people. So, even though Meta says that its community guidelines do not condone behavior that discriminates against certain groups, in fact, narratives of discrimination against LGBT people pass through in Meta’s permitted review of political ads.
As with attacks on women, there are narrative patterns that can be identified in cases of attacks on LGBT people. First, narratives from political actors (regional heads, legislative members, and legislative candidates) who announce anti-LGBT, LGBT as immoral behavior, and calls to discriminate against LGBT. Second, narratives from voters that encourage political parties and candidates to discriminate, expel and punish LGBT.
It’s not difficult to find content that attacks this group. Enter the keywords “LGBT”, “LGBT elections”, “LGBT morals”, “anti-LGBT”, “expel LGBT”, “LGBT legislative candidates”, and “(name of party) LGBT”, you can find a lot of the content I mean.
The third vulnerable group that experiences online discrimination is mental disabilities. The pattern that I found was that mental disabilities were stigmatized as a group that was unable to vote in elections. A pattern that was also frequently found was the promotion of opinions that the KPU used the votes of “crazy people” to win certain parties and presidential-vice presidential candidate pairs.
In fact, there is Constitutional Court Decision No.135/PUU-XIII/2015 which states that mental disabilities have the right to vote as long as there is no certificate from a mental health specialist stating that a person is unable to vote because they have a permanent mental disorder.
The keywords I use to find online content of attacks and discrimination against mental disabilities are “election crazy”, “election crazy people”, and “TPS crazy”.
Unsurprisingly, these attacks are intertwined with disinformation. One example of a hoax that went viral in the 2019 Election was the hoax about people with mental disabilities being forced to vote at the TPS. The framing of this hoax is how the KPU is trying to win one of the presidential candidates by mobilizing votes with mental disabilities. In fact, the incident behind the photo that went viral was a mentally disabled person who was transported by security forces because he was involved in a criminal case.
Hate speech, discrimination, disinformation, trolling and doxing are just some of the other types of online attacks during the election. The targets are not only vulnerable groups, but also election organizers, human rights activists, journalists and election participants. The challenge of securing social media is getting bigger with the presence of artificial intelligence. A joint or multi-stakeholder commitment is needed to build a constructive and inclusive narrative in the 2024 election campaign.
How do we organize campaigns on social media?
The Election Law (UU) has regulated norms regarding the prohibition of using ethnic, religious, racial and inter-group (SARA) issues in election campaigns, along with criminal threats. However, there are no specific norms regarding election disinformation. Also, Article 280 only targets campaign organizers, election participants and campaign teams.
Unfortunately, there is also no meaningful effort to fill the legal void for campaigns on social media in the Campaign Regulations of the KPU (PKPU). There are only four changes in the PKPU Election Campaign. Two of them are, the limit for election participant accounts on each social media platform is a maximum of 20 accounts, and the social media account registration form must also be submitted to the Ministry of Communication and Informatics (Kominfo).
In the midst of inadequate regulations regarding online campaigns, or more specifically on social media, it is necessary to have a code of ethics for campaigns on social media that binds election participants and social media platforms. Platforms are parties that must also be regulated, because platforms are the ones who can moderate content, and the fact that various online attacks occur on social media platforms. The European Union, for example, agrees that there must be an increase in the degree of responsibility, accountability and transparency of social media platforms.
A code of ethics for campaigns on social media was implemented in Indonesia during the 2020 regional elections. Tulisem was one of the initiators. This code of ethics was then developed by several countries, including Thailand for the 2023 elections.
There are two main issues that are important to agree on in the code of ethics by election participants. First, campaign constructively, prioritizing inclusivity and non-violence. Second, avoid spreading misleading content, hate speech, and messages that incite violence.
Meanwhile, for social media platforms, three main points that need to be committed are, first, implementing an easy-to-use reporting and response mechanism for content moderation related to the 2024 Election. Second, providing a content moderation mechanism that involves civil society. Third, publish a content moderation accountability report during the 2024 election stages.
I recommend also that both political parties and social media platforms agree on three additional points. First, open transparency in political advertising on social media platforms to maintain the integrity and accountability of campaign funds in the 2024 elections. Second, respect the principles of protecting personal data, both for offline campaign purposes and micro-targeting in political advertising on social media. And third, declaring forms of use of artificial intelligence in election campaigns.
Learning from initiatives in the 2023 Thai Election, compliance with the campaign code of ethics is regularly monitored. Because Thailand does not have a General Election Supervisory Body (Bawaslu), a civil society coalition formed an ad hoc team to carry out monitoring. In the Indonesian context, Bawaslu, which has supervisors up to regional level, can carry out supervision, by collaborating with civil society coalitions, social media platforms and Kominfo. Regular reports could be published to find out at least which election participants are using the most discriminatory narratives and disinformation as campaign tactics, and which social media platforms are the most responsive in moderating illegal and harmful content.
A code of ethics for campaigns on social media can become a joint commitment encouraged by Bawaslu RI. Hopefully it is not too late to collaborate, pushing for a more constructive and inclusive election campaign. []
NURUL AMALIA SALABI
Researcher of the Association for Elections and Democracy (Perludem)
This article was published on rumahpemilu.org on September 28 2023 with the title “Kode Etik Kampanye di Media Sosial untuk Pemilu 2024”, https://rumahpemilu.org/kode-etik-kampanye-di-media-sosial-untuk-pemilu-2024/